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1 Introduction
Standard valuation models subtract the amount of cash in the firm’s balance sheet from the value of
debt outstanding in order to calculate the firm’s financial leverage. This practice reflects the view of
cash as the “negative” of debt: because cash balances can be readily used to redeem debt (a senior
claim), only net leverage should matter in gauging shareholders’ (residual) wealth. The traditional
valuation approach can also be understood under an “indifference” argument: since financial assets
and financial liabilities are largely unrelated to the real business activities of nonfinancial firms,
shareholders should be indifferent between one extra dollar of cash and one less dollar of debt in
those firms’ balance sheets. In one way or another, the standard valuation approach does not assign
much of a relevant, independent role for cash stocks in the presence of debt.
In contrast to this view, a number of recent studies argue that cash holdings are an important
component of the firm’s optimal financial structure. Among other results, these studies show that
cash policies are correlated with firm value, growth opportunities, business risk, and performance.
They also show that cash holdings relate to issues ranging from firms’ access to the capital markets
to the quality of laws protecting minority investors.1 One interpretation of the findings in this
literature is that cash should not be seen as negative debt for a large fraction of firms: cash stocks
seem to play a relevant economic role. However, as Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999)
point out, most of the variables that are empirically associated with high cash levels are also known
to be associated with low leverage. The findings that cash holdings are systematically related to
variables such as growth opportunities and risk – although relevant in their own right – may
thus provide only a partial view of firms’ policies regarding cash and debt. In effect, those findings
cannot rule out the argument that firms do regard cash and negative debt as close substitutes. In
the words of Opler et al. (p.44), “...it is important to figure out, both theoretically and empirically,
to what extent cash holdings and debt are two sides of the same coin.”
This paper proposes a testable theory of cash—debt substitutability in the optimal financial policy
of the firm. The starting point of our analysis is the observation that while traditional valuation
models assume that financing is frictionless, most real-world managers will argue that raising funds
in the capital markets is often “too” costly (Graham and Harvey (2001)). Indeed, contracting
and information frictions seem to entail additional costs to external financing. Exposure to those
costs significantly affects the way firms conduct their financial and investment policies (Almeida,
1An incomplete list of papers in this literature includes Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998), Harford (1999), Opler,
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003), Harford, Mikkelson, and Partch
(2003), Mikkelson and Partch (2003), Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2003), Pinkowitz and Williamson (2003),
Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), Faulkender and Wang (2004), and Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2004).
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et al. (2004) and Faulkender and Petersen (2004)), giving rise to a “hedging motive” (cf. Froot,
Scharfstein, and Stein (1993)).2 Building on this argument, we develop a theoretical framework
in which cash and debt policies are determined by the firm’s optimization of investments over
time. Under uncertainty about the availability of future investment opportunities and about cash
flows from operations, we identify conditions in which cash is not the same as negative debt. By
contrasting these conditions with a benchmark case in which financing frictions are irrelevant (and
hence there is no hedging motive), we are able to assess how firms optimally carry out both their
cash and debt policies.
In the absence of financing frictions, firms’ future investment levels are independent of their
current cash policies. Firms need not save internally to fund future profitable opportunities since
all such opportunities will find financing in the capital markets. Because of this independence, and
in the absence of other costs/benefits of carrying cash and debt, for financially unconstrained firms
it is a matter of indifference as to whether they use their excess cash flows to increase internal
savings or to lower debt. This policy choice has no value implications.
In sharp contrast, constrained firms’ financial policies can be value-enhancing. Both higher cash
stocks and lower debt levels today increase a constrained firm’s future funding capacity and thus its
ability to undertake new investment opportunities. We show, however, that a trade-off guides those
firms’ choice between higher cash and lower debt. On the one hand, internal savings are useful for
investment optimization when constrained firms experience income shortfalls. In particular, in low
cash flow states the effect of cash on investment will be higher than the corresponding effect of lower
debt (i.e., greater borrowing capacity). On the other hand, in states in which cash flows are high,
higher cash balances will have a lower effect on financing capacity than a corresponding reduction
in outstanding debt. These differential effects of cash and debt on future financing capacity arise
from the riskiness of the debt obligation. To wit, note that the current market value of (risky)
debt is largely supported by future states of the world in which cash flows are high. Consequently,
reducing the amount of outstanding debt by one dollar today increases future debt capacity in good
states by more than one dollar. Likewise, reducing outstanding debt by one dollar today increases
future debt capacity in bad states by less than one dollar. In contrast, saving one additional dollar
of cash today increases future financing capacity in all future states by exactly one dollar.
Our theory essentially implies that while cash holdings have a significant effect on future financ-
ing capacity and investment in bad states of the world (low cash flow states), debt reductions are a
particularly effective way of boosting investment in high cash flow states. We use this trade-off to
2 In Froot et al. a demand for hedging arises naturally from the firm’s need to smooth out the impact of financing
frictions on real investment.
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derive clear predictions for how firms allocate free cash flows across their cash and debt accounts. In
particular, we predict that a constrained firm will prefer saving cash (as opposed to repaying debt)
out of current cash flow surpluses if the correlation between cash flows and investment opportunities
is low. In contrast, if that correlation is high, the firm benefits more from allocating its marginal
dollar of free cash flow towards debt reductions (i.e., from “saving” future borrowing capacity).
The intuition for our model’s predictions can be easily understood in the context of the hedging
framework of Froot et al. (1993). Holding cash has hedging value for a financially constrained firm
because cash allows the firm to invest more in states of the world in which borrowing capacity is
low. If the correlation between cash flows and investment opportunities is low (hedging needs are
high), the constrained firm will have a preference towards holding cash. However, if profitable in-
vestment opportunities tend to arise in those states in which cash flows are high, then the benefit of
hedging strategies is lower because the constrained firm has a “natural hedge.”3 The natural hedge
decreases the value of cash holdings, and makes it more likely that the firm will prefer reducing its
current leverage.
Our analysis casts doubt on the standard view of cash as the negative of debt; a view that is
commonly used in corporate valuation. Cash and (negative) debt balances are not necessarily sub-
stitutes. In particular, financially constrained firms with high hedging needs strictly prefer positive
cash to negative debt; a preference that has value consequences. For this type of firm, cash holdings
play a significant economic role because cash allows the firm to bring future investment closer to
efficient levels, which maximizes value. In contrast, constrained firms with low hedging needs value
spare debt capacity; they prefer negative debt to positive cash.
Regarding unconstrained firms, our model’s prediction that they should be indifferent between
various combinations of cash and debt policies suggests that, for these firms, cash could be viewed
as negative debt. However, we note that the strict indeterminacy of cash and debt policies only
holds in the absence of other costs and benefits that are unrelated to financial constraints; such as
the possibility that cash has a low yield, that cash can be diverted by management, or that debt
provides for tax shields. As previous researchers have shown, these issues may very well influence
corporate policies. Importantly, though, even when unconstrained firms display systematic prefer-
ences towards cash or debt our constrained model can still be identified in the data. The reason
is that unconstrained firms’ choice between higher cash and lower debt today is independent of
considerations about future financing capacity. The lack of a relationship between unconstrained
firms’ policies and hedging needs in turn provides us with an additional identification restriction. To
3Gay and Nam (1998) and Petersen and Thiagarajan (2000) also explore the notion that firms whose investment
opportunities are highly correlated with the source of cash flow risk are less likely to demand hedging. Differently
from our study, however, those previous papers focus on derivatives usage in order to measure hedging demand.
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wit, while constrained firms’ propensity to allocate cash flows towards cash or debt should depend
on the correlation between their cash flows and investment opportunities, such a dependence should
not exist for unconstrained firms.
In the final part of our paper we evaluate the extent to which our theory’s implications are
borne in the data. In doing so, we look at a large sample of manufacturing firms between 1971
and 2001. We estimate the simultaneous (within-firm) responses of cash and debt policies to cash
flow innovations for various subsamples partitioned both on (1) the likelihood that firms have con-
strained/unconstrained access to external capital and (2) measures of the correlation between firms’
cash flows and investment opportunities (hedging needs). We consider four alternative firm charac-
teristics in empirically identifying constrained and unconstrained subsamples: (1) payout policy, (2)
asset size, (3) bond ratings, and (4) commercial paper ratings. To measure the correlation between
cash flows and investment opportunities, we use a firm’s cash flow from operations and either its
industry-level (1) median R&D expenditures, (2) median three-years ahead sales growth rates, or
(3) changes in median Q.4 While the measures of financial constraints we use are quite standard,
the measures of hedging needs are, to our knowledge, new to the literature.
We find robust, coherent results on financial policy-making across all of our empirical tests. First,
unconstrained firms do not display a propensity to save cash out of cash flows. Instead, consistent
with the bulk of the capital structure literature, they use their free cash flows towards reducing the
amount of debt that they carry. Crucially, as predicted by our model, this pattern holds irrespective
of how unconstrained firms’ cash flows correlate with investment opportunities. When we then look
at constrained firms, we find markedly different patterns in the way cash and debt policies are
conducted. On average, constrained firms do not use excess cash flows to reduce debt, but instead
prefer using those inflows to boost cash holdings. More importantly, we find that constrained firms’
propensities to reduce debt and to increase cash are strongly influenced by the correlation between
their cash flows and investment opportunities. In other words, hedging needs drive large cross-
sectional differences in the optimal balance between cash and debt policies among constrained firms.
When their hedging needs are low, constrained firms behave somewhat similarly to unconstrained
firms: they show a propensity to use excess cash flows to reduce the amount of debt they carry into
future periods, and display a relatively weaker (largely insignificant) cash flow sensitivity of cash
savings. When constrained firms have high hedging needs, however, they display a strong preference
for saving cash (their cash flow sensitivity of cash is positive and highly significant), and they show
no propensity to pay down debt. These results are fully consistent with the predictions of our model.
4The reason for using aggregate industry-level measures of investment opportunities is that such measures are ex-
ogenous to the individual firms’ internal cash flow processes. Firm-level measures, in contrast, could be contaminated
by firms’ ability to undertake their investment opportunities and thus by the degree of firm financing constraints.
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Our paper is related to several strands of literature and it is important that we establish the
marginal contribution of our analysis. We have already discussed the literature on cash policies. The
main contribution of our paper to that literature is that we model both cash and debt policies within
an integrated framework. We isolate theoretically and empirically one element that affects the cash
and debt policies of firms facing imperfect capital markets – namely, the intertemporal relation
between cash flows and investment opportunities – and use this wedge to identify the cash—debt
policy interplay. This approach is new to the literature on corporate liquidity management.
Our paper is also related to the literature on corporate hedging. As we have suggested, the basic
intuition behind our theory is similar to that of Froot et al.’s (1993) seminal work.5 Our contribution
to this literature is two-fold. First, we develop and test a model that shows how firms can use both
their cash and debt policies as hedging tools. As discussed by Petersen and Thiagarajan (2000),
while the hedging literature focuses on the use of derivatives, in practice, firms use alternative means
of hedging involving financial and operating strategies. In this vein, our analysis suggests that the
cash—debt interplay represents an interesting new dimension researchers can explore in studying
corporate hedging. Second, we report empirical findings that are fully consistent with the view that
financial constraints create incentives for hedging. Previous attempts to test Froot et al.’s theory
have focused on the use of derivative instruments and generally yielded mixed results.6
Our empirical approach follows the current capital structure literature in that we focus on
companies’ marginal financing decisions (debt issuance and repurchase activities) in order to learn
about financial policy-making. Examples of recent papers that use this approach are Shyam-Sunder
and Myers (1999), Frank and Goyal (2003), and Lemmon and Zender (2004). These papers are
concerned with a firm’s choice between debt and equity in the face of an internal “financing deficit”
whose calculation takes cash holdings as exogenous. In contrast, our study endogenizes cash hold-
ings and focuses on the cash versus debt margin.
Finally, our study is also related to the large literature on the impact of financing constraints on
corporate policies (see Hubbard (1998) for a review). While earlier studies in that literature focused
on firms’ physical investments and other real expenditures, a few recent papers analyze the impact
of constraints on firms’ financial policies (e.g., Almeida et al. (2004) and Faulkender and Petersen
5Previous papers have proposed alternative motivations for hedging (other than financial constraints), including
tax convexity (Smith and Stulz (1985)), debt capacity and associated tax shields (Leland (1998) and Stulz (1996)),
managerial risk-aversion (Stulz (1984) and Smith and Stulz (1985)), costs of financial distress (Smith and Stulz (1985)),
and information issues (DeMarzo and Duffie (1991)). Empirical work testing these hypotheses includes Tufano (1996),
Haushalter (2001), and Graham and Rogers (2002). See Petersen and Thiagarajan (2000) for a survey of the literature.
6Papers with evidence that speak to the link between financial constraints and hedging include Nance, Smith,
and Smithson (1993), Mian (1996), Géczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997), Gay and Nam, (1998), and Guay (1999).
As discussed by Vickery (2004), the bulk of the evidence suggests that, contrary to expectations, the use of financial
derivatives is concentrated in large (likely unconstrained) companies. In addition, even for large public companies
the magnitude of derivatives hedging seems to be very small (see Guay and Kothari (2003)).
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(2004)). We contribute to this latter line of research by suggesting an additional financial decision
that is directly affected by capital markets constraints: the choice between saving and borrowing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we lay out a model
of cash—debt substitutability in the presence of financing constraints and derive its empirical pre-
dictions. Section 3 describes our empirical methods and presents our main findings. Section 4
concludes the paper.
2 The Model
We model the optimal financial policy of a firm that has profitable growth opportunities in the
future but that might face limited access to external capital when funding those opportunities. In
maximizing investment value, the firm’s main financial policy variables are cash and debt. The
admittedly simple structure of the model is meant to capture the essential elements of our theory
of financial management under financing constraints.
2.1 Structure
2.1.1 Assets and Technologies
The model has three dates. The firm starts the model at date 0 with assets in place that will
produce cash flows at date 2. This cash flow c2 is random from the perspective of date 0. At date 1,
the firm learns whether this cash flow is high (cH), which happens with probability p, or low (cL),
which happens with probability (1− p). The firm also has an existing amount of internal funds at
date 0, equal to c0 > 0. The time line of the model is presented in Figure 1.
At date 1, the firm can make an additional investment I, which produces output equal to
g(I) at date 2. Whether the firm has a profitable growth opportunity at date 1 depends on the
distribution of cash flows from assets in the following way. If cash flows are high (state H), then
the firm will have an investment opportunity with probability φ < 1, and with probability (1− φ),
there is no investment opportunity. If cash flows are low (state L), the probability that the firm
has an investment opportunity is equal to (1 − φ), while with probability φ there is no additional
investment.
The parameter φ captures the correlation between cash flows from existing assets and future
investment opportunities – this is in the spirit of Froot et al. (1993). Notice that when φ = 12 the
firm has the same probability of having profitable investment in either state; that is, the correlation
between cash flows and investment opportunities is zero. When φ > 12 that correlation is positive
because the firm is more likely to have profitable investments when cash flows are high.
6
•Redeem ∆ units of 
existing debt.
•Carry (c0 - ∆) as 
cash reserves to 
next period.
•Interim cash-flow is 
observed.
•Project opportunity, 
if any, is observed.
•New financing is 
raised, if required.
•All cash-flows are 
realized.
•Only a fraction τ is 
pledgeable to creditors.
•Creditors are paid, 
residual kept by firm.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
c0
p
1-p
H
L
φ
1- φ
1- φ
Project available
Project unavailable
Project available
Project unavailable
cH + g(IH) - IH
cH
cL + g(IL) - IL
cL
φ
Figure 1: Model time line
2.1.2 Financing and Limited Pledgeability
We consider a firm run by a manager (entrepreneur) with some debt in its capital structure. The
manager and the creditors are assumed to be risk-neutral. The firm starts the model with an
exogenous amount of debt with face value equal to d2. We assume that existing creditors cannot
access the cash flows produced by the new investment opportunity, g(I).7 Existing debt is then
backed entirely by the cash flow from assets c2.8 At date 0, the firm can both redeem some of this
debt and issue additional debt backed by cash flows from assets if it wishes to do so. The amount
of debt redemption is captured by the parameter ∆, which can be greater or lower than zero; with
a negative value implying issuance of new debt. After debt redemption/issuance, the face value of
debt goes to dN2 . We will determine below the relationship between d
N
2 , ∆, and d2.
Besides debt redemption, the firm chooses at date 0 how much cash to carry into date 1. Given
our assumptions, the level of cash retained is equal to c1 = c0−∆. The firm can raise new financing
at date 1 backed by existing assets or by the new investment opportunity. If dN2 is such that there is
additional debt capacity from existing assets, then these assets can support more external finance.
Also, the firm can raise more finance by pledging the cash flows g(I). We denote this amount of
7This assumption is simply meant to eliminate the possibility of debt overhang (Myers (1977)) in our model.
8Because existing debt is backed by cash flows that do not depend on the payoffs of date-1 investment, the firm
has no incentives at date 1 to undertake negative NPV investments that transfer value away from creditors.
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new finance at date 1 by B1. Notice that because there is no longer any uncertainty at date 1,
B1 will be fully repaid at date 2. The risk-free rate is normalized to zero and all new financing is
assumed to be fairly priced.
We assume that the firm can only pledge a fraction τ of the cash flows that both the existing
assets and the new investment opportunity produce. This limited pledgeability assumption can be
justified under many contracting frameworks. For example, it arises from the inalienability of human
capital (Hart and Moore (1994)). To wit, entrepreneurs cannot contractually commit never to leave
the firm. This leaves open the possibility that an entrepreneur will use the threat of withdrawing
his human capital to renegotiate the agreed upon payments. If the entrepreneur’s human capital
is essential to the project, he will get a fraction of the cash flows. Limited pledgeability is also an
implication of the Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) model of moral hazard in project choice. When
project choice cannot be specified contractually, investors must leave a high enough fraction of the
payoff to entrepreneurs so as to induce them to choose the project with highest potential profitability.
Limited pledgeability implies that the new financing that can be raised at date 1 is capped:
B1 ≤ τg(I) +
h
τc2 − d
N
2
i+
, (1)
where c2 is either equal to cL or cH . Because of this quantity constraint, the firm might not be able
to undertake its investment opportunities to their optimal extent, as we describe below.
Finally, we assume that if the cash reserve c1 is not employed toward investments at date 1,
then it is claimed as a “dividend” or diverted by the entrepreneur. We stress that this is only a sim-
plifying assumption. Allowing for limited pledgeability of the unemployed cash reserves, similarly
to what we do for cash flows, does not affect the qualitative nature of our results (see footnote 10).
2.2 Solution
We solve the model backwards starting at date 1. At this date, the firm chooses optimal investment
and new financing levels for given amounts of retained cash and existing debt. Then, given expected
future investment choices, the firm chooses the optimal cash and debt redemption policies at date 0.
2.2.1 Date 1 - Optimal Investment Choice
Notice that if there is no investment opportunity, then the firm does not have any relevant choice
to make. Alternatively, if there is an investment opportunity, then the optimal date-1 behavior
amounts to determining the value-maximizing investment levels, subject to the relevant budget and
financing constraints. Specifically, the firm solves the following program at each relevant state of
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nature given ∆, d
N
2 , and the realization of c2:
max
I
g(I)− I s.t. (2)
I ≤ c0 −∆+B1, and
B1 ≤ τg(I) +
h
τc2 − d
N
2
i+
,
where the two constraints can be collapsed as the firm’s financing constraint:
I ≤ c0 −∆+ τg(I) +
h
τc2 − d
N
2
i+
. (3)
The financing available to the firm consists of (i) c0−∆, the cash holdings of the firm; (ii) τg(I), the
financing that can be raised against the pledgeable cash flows from the new investment opportunity;
and (iii)
h
τc2 − d
N
2
i+
, the spare debt capacity (if any) from cash flows of the existing project.
We define IFB, the first-best investment level, as:
g0(IFB) = 1. (4)
If the financial constraint (3) is satisfied at IFB, the firm invests IFB. Otherwise, it invests the
value that exactly satisfies the constraint (3). In the latter case, we have g
0
(I) > 1. A necessary
condition for the problem to be reasonable is that a decrease in investment relaxes the constraint,
that is, τg
0
(I) < 1 for any I that is less than IFB. Otherwise, it may be possible for the firm
to self-finance the new investment opportunity and it may never be constrained – the financial
constraint could be relaxed by simply increasing investment.
We shall denote this constrained investment level as IL(∆) for state L and as IH(∆) for state
H, where we emphasize the dependence on ∆, the debt redemption parameter. These investment
levels can be used to characterize firm financial constraints:
Definition A firm is financially constrained if investment is below the first-best level in at least one
state of nature. A firm is financially unconstrained when investment is at the first-best level in both
states of nature.
2.2.2 Date 0 - Optimal Cash and Debt Policies
We now determine whether the firm is better off retaining cash or repaying debt at date 0. The
date-0 financial policy can be subsumed in the optimal choice of ∆, which determines both the face
value of debt d
N
2 and the level of cash retained for the future, c1 = c0 −∆.
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Market Values of Debt The first step is to determine how debt repayment ∆ will affect the face
value of debt d
N
2 . Without loss of generality, we can assume that the level of debt before repayment,
d2, is lower than the maximum income that can be extracted by existing creditors in state H:
d2 ≤ τcH . (5)
Anything bigger than this is not compatible with limited pledgeability, and can therefore be ignored.
In addition, we also suppose that the initial debt of the firm is risky:
d2 ≥ τcL. (6)
That is, the low cash flow state is to be interpreted as a state in which the firm’s cash flow is lower
than the promised payment on the existing debt. The market value of existing debt is hence equal to
D0 = pd2 + (1− p)min[τcL, d2] ≥ τcL. (7)
As is standard in modeling repurchases, we assume that (i) the firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it
“surprise” offer to the existing creditors to redeem debt by a total amount of ∆, and (ii) creditors
constitute a homogeneous pool that can be treated as a single creditor. In this case, the new face
value of debt dN2 (∆) must be such that the existing creditors are indifferent between whether or
not to tender debt:9
DN0 = D0 −∆. (8)
The new face value of debt, dN2 , must also satisfy:
DN0 = pd
N
2 + (1− p)min[τcL, dN2 ]. (9)
Thus we must have:
dN2 = d2 −
∆
p
, if τcL < dN2 (10)
= D0 −∆, if τcL ≥ dN2 .
Intuitively, when the debt repayment is not so large as to make the new debt completely riskless,
one unit of debt repayment reduces the new face value by more than one unit. But when the debt
becomes riskless this effect disappears, and one unit of repayment reduces face value by one unit.10
9Because creditors are indifferent between tendering and not tendering, this equation effectively assumes that if
debt redemption creates value this value will be entirely captured by the firm. We note, however, that the model’s
conclusions would be the same if creditors were to capture a fraction of the NPV of redemption, as long as they do
not capture the entire NPV.
10 If we assume that a fraction τ of the cash reserve c1 is also pledgeable to creditors whenever it is not employed
for investments, then the expressions for D0, DN0 , and d
N
2 are somewhat different. In particular, we obtain that (i)
if τ(c1 + cL) < dN2 , then d
N
2 = d2 − [1−(1−p)τφ]p ∆; (ii) if τcL < d
N
2 < τ(c1 + cL), then d
N
2 < d2 − 1[p+(1−p)φ]∆; and
(iii) if τcL > dN2 , then d
N
2 = D0 −∆. The expressions for dN2 thus retain the following property: except when debt is
rendered riskless, a dollar of cash used in debt redemption frees up more than a dollar of debt capacity in the high
cash flow state. So long as this intuitive property holds, our results obtain.
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Notice that Eq. (10) also determine the new face value of debt when ∆ < 0; i.e., when the firm
issues additional debt. Because of limited pledgeability, ∆ < 0 is only possible if τcH is strictly
greater than the existing face value d2. The minimum possible value of ∆ is such that τcH = dN2 .
This minimum level can be written as
∆min = −[pτcH + (1− p)τcL −D0]. (11)
Finally, ∆ cannot be higher than either the market value of existing debt D0, or the firm’s total
internal funds, c0:
∆max = min(c0,D0). (12)
Optimal Policies The optimal choice of ∆ is determined by the following program:
max
∆∈[∆min, ∆max]
pφ [g(I∗H(∆))− I∗H(∆)] + (1− p)(1− φ) [g(I∗L(∆))− I∗L(∆)] , (13)
where I∗H(∆) and I
∗
L(∆) are the investment levels that obtain for each choice of∆. Specifically, if∆ is
such that the first-best investment level is feasible for a given state s, then I∗s (∆) = I
FB. Otherwise,
I∗s (∆) is equal to Is(∆) as determined in Section 2.2.1 (by the financial constraint, Eq. (3)).
Before we characterize the optimal solution, it is useful to understand intuitively what is accom-
plished by the choice of financial policy. The key intuition is established by the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Let e∆ be defined by e∆ = [D0− τcL]. For ∆ < e∆, IH(∆) is strictly increasing in ∆ and
IL(∆) is strictly decreasing in ∆. For ∆ ≥ e∆, IH(∆) and IL(∆) are independent of ∆.
In words, debt repayment at date 0 is associated with a trade-off in the future choice of invest-
ment. If a firm chooses to repay more debt, it can increase investment in the state of nature in which
cash flows are high (state H). However, this decreases feasible investment in state L. Thus, state-L
investment increases with the level of cash balances (c0 −∆) that the firm carries to the future.
We prove this Lemma in Appendix B. The intuition is as follows. If the face value of existing
debt is higher than the pledgeable cash flows in state L, then the value of debt at date 0 is supported
mostly by state-H cash flows. Hence, if the firm decides to use one unit of date-0 cash to reduce
outstanding debt, it reduces the promised payment for state H by more than one unit. As a conse-
quence, state-H financing capacity goes up even though the firm carries one less unit of cash until
date 1. If the firm is financially constrained in state H, this effect increases state-H investment. By
the same token, debt capacity in state L goes up by less than one unit, and thus feasible state-L
investment goes down because the firm has less cash. The cut-off level e∆ represents the maximum
amount of debt that can be repaid before debt becomes riskless. Once debt is riskless, the debt
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repayment has no effect on financing capacity. However, note that debt issues, which are feasible
when ∆min < 0, increase financing capacity in state L at the expense of state H even when current
debt is riskless.
We start the characterization of the optimal financial policy with the following lemma. (See
Appendix B for the proof.)
Lemma 2 The firm is financially unconstrained if and only if it is unconstrained in state L when
∆ = ∆min. Otherwise, it is financially constrained in the sense that there does not exist a ∆ that
allows the firm to invest at first-best levels in both states.
This lemma is a straightforward implication of the fact that in terms of financing capacity the
only (ex post) difference between state L and state H is that cash flows from existing assets are
higher in state H. Thus, the financing capacity in state H is always higher than in state L, for
all possible ∆, which means that if the firm is financially unconstrained in state L, it must also be
financially unconstrained in state H. Because state-L financing capacity is decreasing in ∆ (Lemma
1), a necessary and sufficient condition for the firm to be unconstrained is that the firm invests at
the first-best level when financing capacity in state L is at its maximum.
With these two lemmas, we can state and prove the central result of our theory.
Proposition 1 The optimal financial policy depends on the degree of financial constraints and on
the correlation between cash flows and investment opportunities as follows:
• If the firm is financially unconstrained, it is indifferent between all possible ∆ in the [∆min, b∆]
range, where b∆ is either equal to ∆max, or to the value of ∆ that renders the firm financially
constrained in state L. Any value of ∆ > b∆, if feasible, yields a lower value for the firm;
• If the firm is financially constrained for all ∆, then the optimal financial policy depends on
the parameter φ:
a. If φ ≤ 12 , the optimal policy is to choose ∆∗ = ∆min;
b. There exists a threshold level φ, satisfying 12 < φ < 1, such that
(i) For φ ≤ φ, the optimal policy is to choose ∆∗ ≤ 0,
(ii) For φ > φ , the optimal policy is to choose ∆∗ > 0;
c. There exists a second threshold level φ, satisfying φ < φ < 1, such that for φ > φ the
optimal policy is to choose ∆∗ = min(e∆,∆max).
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Figure 2: Optimal financial policy of a constrained firm
In words, Proposition 1 suggests that unconstrained firms should be indifferent between using
current internal funds to increase cash holdings or to reduce debt. In contrast, financially con-
strained firms should display a clear preference for holding cash or reducing debt, depending on the
correlation between cash flows from assets and new investment opportunities. If this correlation is
zero or negative (φ ≤ 12), the optimal policy is to increase investment in state L as much as possible.
This is accomplished by making ∆ equal to the lowest possible value, ∆min, which might involve
additional debt issues when ∆min < 0. In any case, the firm has a preference towards carrying cash
into the future. Furthermore, as long as the correlation is low enough (φ ≤ φ), the firm continues
to prefer carrying cash to date 1 (∆∗ ≤ 0). However, if the correlation is high (φ > φ), the optimal
policy might involve using at least some of the firm’s current internal funds c0 to repay debt. Fi-
nally, for very high correlation values (φ > φ), the constrained firm should use its current internal
funds for debt redemption until it either exhausts its internal funds (∆∗ = ∆max), or it completely
eliminates the risk of debt (∆∗ = e∆).11 These effects are depicted in Figure 2.
In order to understand our policy results, consider first the case in which the correlation between
cash flows and investment opportunities is zero (i.e., φ = 12 ) and the firm is constrained. In this
11To derive Proposition 1, we have assumed that the parameters are such that a constrained firm is constrained for all
possible values of ∆. Given the results in Lemmas 1 and 2, a sufficient condition for this is that the firm is constrained
in state H for ∆ = ∆max. Because investment in state H increases with ∆, it is possible that for a large value of ∆
(call it ∆unc) the constrained firm becomes unconstrained in state H, while still constrained in state L. In this case,
it can no longer be optimal for the firm to increase debt repayments beyond ∆unc. Nevertheless, Proposition 1 would
also hold in this case, with the additional condition that the optimal debt repayment amount ∆∗ is lower than ∆unc.
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case, the (ex ante) productivity of the firm’s investment is the same in both states. Because the
production function is concave, the optimal investment policy involves equalizing investment levels
across states. But since financing capacity is always higher in state H, the constrained firm benefits
from increasing capacity in state L as much as possible. This is accomplished by making cash
holdings as high as possible (∆ = ∆min). If φ < 12 it is even more desirable to increase investment
in state L. However, as the correlation parameter φ increases, it becomes more likely that the firm
will need funds in state H because expected productivity in that state goes up. At high levels of
φ, equalization of the marginal productivity of investment across states requires debt repayment.
Notice that the optimal policy for a constrained firm is independent of p, the probability of state
H. This may appear unintuitive since a low p makes debt more risky and enhances the benefits
of debt redemption. However, a low p also implies that the firm is less likely to end up in state
H, where the benefits of debt redemption will be realized in the form of freed-up debt capacity.
Similarly, while a high p makes it more likely that funds will be needed in state H, it makes existing
debt less risky and results in a lower increase in state-H financing capacity for a given amount of
debt repayment. As we show in the proof of Proposition 1 (see Appendix B), these two effects
cancel each other out and p drops out of the conditions that characterize optimality.
In contrast to a constrained firm, a financially unconstrained firm can achieve first-best invest-
ment levels irrespective of financial policy, and thus small changes in ∆ have no effect on investment
and value. The only policy that is sub-optimal for an unconstrained firm is to reduce cash holdings
so much that the firm becomes constrained in state L, as explained in Proposition 1.
Our model yields comparative statics results that naturally lend themselves to empirical testing.
We discuss these comparative statics in turn.
Proposition 2 Suppose the firm is financially constrained for all ∆. We obtain the following effects
on the firm’s cash and debt policies from a variation in the availability of internal funds, c0:
• If the correlation between cash flows and investment opportunities is low (φ ≤ 12), then a
change in c0 should result in a corresponding change in the firm’s cash balances (∂c1∂c0 > 0),
but no change in the amount of debt outstanding ( ∂∆∂c0 = 0).
• If the correlation between cash flows and investment opportunities is high (φ > φ), then a
change in c0 should change the amount of debt outstanding ( ∂∆∂c0 > 0), but not the firm’s cash
balances (∂c1∂c0 = 0).
These comparative statics results are a straightforward consequence of the optimal policies
characterized in Proposition 1. If the correlation φ is low, then the firm does not benefit from debt
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repayment. Consequently, increases (decreases) in internal funds result in increases (decreases) in
the amount of cash balances held by the firm. For very high correlation levels, however, the firm’s
optimal policy is such that it benefits more from debt repayments than from holding cash. In this
range, changes in internal funds lead to same-direction changes in debt levels.
For intermediate correlation levels (φ ∈ (12 , φ)), the firm is in an equilibrium in which internal
funds are split between debt repayments/issues and cash balances (cf. Proposition 1). In this
range, intuition would suggest that an increase in cash flows would lead both to an increase in cash
(∂c1∂c0 > 0), and to a smaller increase (or a higher reduction) in debt (
∂∆
∂c0
> 0). Nevertheless, the
precise change in financial policies depends also on the rate of change of the marginal productivi-
ties following a change in cash flows. Because the comparative statics are less clear in this range,
Proposition 2 focuses on correlation ranges for which implications are clear-cut.
2.3 Empirical Implications
Our theory’s key empirical implications concern how constrained firms should allocate cash flows
into cash and debt balances. As we have emphasized, this dimension of financial policy is governed
by a hedging motive – captured by the correlation between cash flows and investment opportunities
under constrained financing. We can summarize our model’s implications as follows:
Implication 1 If the correlation between cash flows and investment opportunities is low (high
hedging needs), then constrained firms allocate their “excess” (or “free”) operating cash flows
primarily into cash balances. Their propensity to use cash flows towards debt reduction is
small. Hence, these firms’ cash flow sensitivity of cash, defined as the fraction of excess cash
flow allocated to cash holdings, should be positive. Also, their cash flow sensitivity of debt,
defined as the effect of cash flows on outstanding debt, should not be significantly negative.
Implication 2 If the correlation between cash flows and investment opportunities is high (low
hedging needs), then constrained firms should display a relatively weaker propensity to save
cash, and a stronger propensity to use current cash flows to reduce debt. Hence, these firms’
cash flow sensitivity of debt should be more negative, while their cash flow sensitivity of cash
should be less positive than those of firms with high hedging needs.
Notice that the theory has less clear implications for the average level of the cash flow sensi-
tivities of cash and debt for constrained firms. Because constrained firms have an incentive to save
financing capacity for the future, intuition suggests that the cash flow sensitivity of cash (debt)
should generally be positive (negative). However, our theory implies that one might observe dif-
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ferent sensitivity patterns depending on the distribution of hedging needs in the sample. We shall
look at these issues in the empirical section.
A relevant observation is that the prediction that the cash flow sensitivity of debt should be neg-
ative for some constrained firms does not strictly mean that such firms must redeem debt. While for
modeling purposes we assumed that there is no other reason for the firm to issue debt other than in-
creasing cash savings, this assumption is unlikely to hold strictly. For example, the firm might need
to finance current investments as well as future ones. Thus, the model’s prediction that some con-
strained firms use cash flows to redeem debt should translate into a propensity to reduce the amount
of debt that the firm currently issues. In other words, on net terms, the firm may or may not display
positive debt issuance activities, yet those activities should fall in response to cash flow innovations.
Regarding unconstrained firms, our benchmark model predicts that because these firms do not
need to worry about financing capacity, their cash and debt policies should not necessarily relate
to cash flow surpluses, or to their hedging needs. In the strictest sense, unconstrained firms do not
have any need to hedge in our model. Nevertheless, for ease of exposition, we also use the term
“high (low) hedging needs” for unconstrained firms depending on whether the correlation between
cash flows and investment opportunities is low (high).
Note also that the strict indeterminacy of financial policies for unconstrained firms in our model
only holds in the absence of other costs and benefits of cash and debt. We show in Appendix A that
in the presence of an additional cost of carrying cash, unconstrained firms will generally prefer to
use excess cash flows to reduce debt instead of adding more cash to their balance sheets. Similarly,
in the presence of an additional benefit of holding cash (or a benefit to carrying debt), unconstrained
firms will prefer saving cash as opposed to reducing debt. Crucially, because these additional costs
and benefits are orthogonal to the financing constraints rationale that we use to derive Propositions
1 and 2, we also show in Appendix A that they do not change the nature of the results derived for
constrained firms. For example, if there is an additional cost of carrying cash, constrained firms’
hedging needs have to be higher in order to induce them to save cash. This effect only changes the
particular value of the correlation cut-off φ below which constrained firms prefer to hold cash.
Finally, notice that because unconstrained firms do not need to worry about future financing
capacity, their cash and debt policies lack a hedging motive. In practical terms, this implies that
irrespective of the levels of the cash flow sensitivities of cash and debt one might observe for
unconstrained firms, these sensitivities should not depend on the correlation between cash flows and
investment opportunities. This insight provides us with a way to identify our model irrespective of
the average levels of cash flow sensitivities that we observe for constrained and unconstrained firms.
We summarize these considerations in an additional implication.
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Implication 3 The levels of unconstrained firms’ cash flow sensitivities of cash and debt may be
different from zero if there are additional costs and benefits of cash and debt. Nevertheless,
these sensitivities should be independent of the correlation between cash flows and investment
opportunities.
3 Empirical Tests
3.1 Sample Selection Criteria
To test our model’s predictions we use a sample of manufacturing firms (SICs 200—399) taken from
COMPUSTAT’s P/S/T, Full Coverage, and Research annual tapes over the 1971—2001 period. We
require firms to provide valid information on their total assets, sales, debt, market capitalization,
cash holdings, operating income, depreciation, tax payments, interest payments, and dividend pay-
ments. We deflate all series to 1971 dollars.
Our data selection criteria and variable construction approach follows that of Almeida et al.
(2004), who study the impact of financing constraints on the management of internal funds, and
that of Frank and Goyal (2003), who look at external financing decisions. Similarly to Frank and
Goyal we look at changes in debt and cash positions using data from firms’ “flow of funds state-
ments” (available from 1971 onwards).12 As in Almeida et al., we discard from the raw data those
firm-years for which the market capitalization is less than $10 million as well as firm-years dis-
playing asset or sales growth exceeding 100%. The first screen eliminates from the sample those
firms with severely limited access to the public markets – our theory about the internal—external
funding interplay implies that the firm does have active (albeit potentially constrained) access to
funds from the financial markets. The second screen eliminates those firm-years registering large
jumps in their business fundamentals (typically indicative of major corporate events).
In identifying in the data those firms with active cash and debt policies, we further require that
firms have at least $0.5 million in cash in their balance sheets, and that they register positive debt
in at least one year of the sample period. For our purposes, it is important that we minimize the
sampling of distressed firms. Cash and debt policies of distressed firms may be primarily driven by
their desire to avoid bankruptcy costs (see Smith and Stulz (1985) and Acharya, Huang, Subrah-
manyam, and Sundaram (2000)). Hence, we require that firm annual sales exceed $1 million and
we eliminate firm-years for which debt exceeds total assets (near-bankruptcy firms).13
12The use of data from the flow of funds statements ensures that the changes in cash and debt figures that we
observe are associated with actual flows of resources as opposed to simple accounting restatements
13We will later experiment with restricting the sample according to measures of financial distress, such as Altman’s
Z-score and the interest coverage ratio.
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Finally, we also eliminate those firms whose net debt issuance or repurchase exceed the value
of their total assets for the year (see Lemmon and Zender (2004)), and those whose market-to-
book asset ratio (or Q) is either negative or greater than 10 (see Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995)
and Almeida and Campello (2004)). Also following Gilchrist and Himmelberg and Almeida and
Campello, we try to minimize the impact of sample attrition on the stability of the data process by
requiring that firms provide more than five years of valid information on their debt and cash policies.
In fact, requiring firms to appear for a minimum of periods in the sample serves an important objec-
tive: it allows us to compute a robust empirical counterpart of the notion of firms’ “hedging needs”
(more on this shortly). Our final sample consists of 20,146 firm-year observations. Descriptive
statistics for the key empirical variables we construct using this sample are provided below.
3.2 Methodology
To test our theory, we need to specify an empirical model that allows us to see how cash flow innova-
tions are absorbed by cash savings and debt issuance policies. We also need to identify in the data
both financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Finally, we need an empirical counterpart for
hedging needs. We tackle each one of these issues in turn.
3.2.1 Empirical Specification
We examine the simultaneous (within-firm) responses of cash and debt policies to cash flow in-
novations across sets of constrained and unconstrained firms through a system of equations. The
equations in the system are parsimoniously specified. In addition to firm size and variables that are
needed to identify the system, the financial policy equations only include proxies that we believe
are related to the primitives of our theory: cash flows and investment opportunities.
Define ∆Debt as the ratio of the net long-term debt issuances (COMPUSTAT’s item #111 —
item #114) to total book value of assets (item #6), and ∆CashHold as changes in the holdings
of cash and other liquid securities (item #234) divided by total assets. CashFlow is an empirical
measure that is designed to proxy for “excess cash flow” in our theory. Recall, we want to study a
firm’s use of “uncommitted” cash inflows towards its cash and debt balances. In empirically mea-
suring these inflows, we start from the firm’s gross operating income (COMPUSTAT’s item #13)
and from it subtract amounts committed to capital reinvestment (proxied by asset depreciation, or
item #14), to the payment of taxes (item #16), to the payment of debtholders (interest expense,
item #15), and to payments to equity holders (dividends, items #19 and #21). We then scale
the remainder by the book value of assets.14 Our basic proxy for investment opportunities, Q, is
14 Implicitly, we see depreciation (item #14) as a minimum amount of investment needed to avoid asset depletion.
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computed as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, or (item #6 + (item
#24 × item #25) − item #60 − item #74) / (item #6). Throughout the analysis we gather
estimates from the following 3SLS system:
∆Debti,t = α0 + α1CashFlowi,t + α2Qi,t + α3Sizei,t (14)
+α4∆CashHoldi,t + α5Debti,t−1 +
X
i
firmi +
X
t
yeart + εdi,t,
∆CashHoldi,t = β0 + β1CashFlowi,t + β2Qi,t + β3Sizei,t (15)
+β4∆Debt+ β5CashHoldi,t−1 +
X
i
firmi +
X
t
yeart + εci,t,
where Size is the natural log of sales (item #12), and firm and year absorb firm- and time-specific
effects, respectively.15
Our theory’s central predictions concern the responses of debt issuance and cash savings to cash
flows, captured by α1 and β1 in Eqs. (14) and (15), respectively. Lagged levels (i.e., stocks) of the de-
pendent variables in those equations are entered in order to identify the system.16 Accordingly, Debt
in Eq. (14) is defined as COMPUSTAT’s item #9 over item #6, and CashHold in (15) is item #1
over item #6. We explicitly control for possible biases stemming from unobserved individual hetero-
geneity and time idiosyncrasies by expunging firm- and time-fixed effects from our slope coefficient
estimates. In fitting the data, we allow residuals to be correlated across our debt and cash models.
3.2.2 Financial Constraints Criteria
Testing the implications of our model requires separating firms according to a priori measures of
the financing frictions that they face. There are a number of plausible approaches to sorting firms
In this vein we see it as a proxy for “nondiscretionary”investment (observed investment spending is of course a more
discretionary measure of investment). Dividends can be seen as discretionary; however, in practice firms do not seem
to fine-tune their dividend policy according to their cash flow process (dividends are relatively sticky, whereas cash
flows are not). We also experimented with the idea of computing CashFlow without the inclusion of dividends and
our findings were qualitatively similar. The same happens if, following a number of studies in the capital structure
literature, we compute CashFlow as net income before extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT’s item #18).
15An alternative approach to answering the question of how cash and debt balances respond to cash flow innovations
across constrained and unconstrained firms is to run the following set of (stacked) OLS regressions across the two
constraint firm-types:
∆Debti,t = α0 + α1CashFlowi,t + α2Qi,t + α3Sizei,t +
[
i
firmi +
[
t
yeart + ε
d
i,t,
∆CashHoldi,t = β0 + β1CashF lowi,t + β2Qi,t + β3Sizei,t +
[
i
firmi +
[
t
yeart + ε
c
i,t.
When we experiment with this SUR-like OLS system we also get results that agree with our theory. However,
using an estimator that, for each sampled firm, simultaneously endogenizes the impact of debt issuance activity on
cash policies and vice-versa – in the way the 3SLS does – provides for a better empirical testing of our theory.
16Our results also hold when we use twiced lagged levels of debt and cash and when we use the projections of
those firm proxies onto indicators for industry-years.
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into financially constrained and unconstrained categories, and we do not have strong priors about
which approach is best. Following Almeida et al. (2004), we use a number of alternative schemes
to partition our sample:
• Scheme #1: In every year over the 1971 to 2001 period, we rank firms based on their payout
ratio and assign to the financially constrained (unconstrained) group those firms that are in
the bottom (top) three deciles of the annual payout distribution. We compute the payout
ratio as the ratio of total distributions (dividends and repurchases) to operating income. The
intuition that financially constrained firms have significantly lower payout ratios follows from
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), among many others, in the financial constraints lit-
erature. In the capital structure literature, Fama and French (2002) use payout ratios as a
measure of the difficulties firms may face in assessing the financial markets.
• Scheme #2: We rank firms based on their asset size over the 1971 to 2001 period and assign
to the financially constrained (unconstrained) group those firms that are in the bottom (top)
three deciles of the size distribution. The rankings are again performed on an annual basis.
This approach resembles that of Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and Erickson and Whited
(2000), who also distinguish between groups of financially constrained and unconstrained firms
on the basis of size. Fama and French (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2003) also associate firm
size with the degree of external financing frictions. The argument for size as a good observable
measure of financial constraints is that small firms are typically young, less well known, and
thus more vulnerable to capital-market imperfections.
• Scheme #3: We retrieve data on firms’ bond ratings and categorize as being financially con-
strained those firms that never had their public debt rated during our sample period. Given
that unconstrained firms may choose not to use debt financing and hence may not have a debt
rating, we only assign to the constrained subsample those firm-years that both lack a rating
and report positive debt (see Faulkender and Petersen (2004)).17 Financially unconstrained
firms are those whose bonds have been rated during the sample period. Related approaches
for characterizing financial constraints are used by Whited (1992), Gilchrist and Himmelberg
(1995), and Lemmon and Zender (2004). The advantage of this measure over the former two
is that it gauges the market ’s assessment of a firm’s credit quality. The same rationale applies
17Firms with no bond rating and no debt are considered unconstrained, but our results are not affected if we treat
these firms as neither constrained nor unconstrained. We use the same criterion for firms with no commercial paper
rating and no debt in scheme #4. In (unreported) robustness checks, we have restricted the sample to the period
where firms’ bond ratings are observed every year (from 1986 to 2001), allowing firms to migrate across constraint
categories. Our conclusions are insensitive to these changes in sampling window and firm assignment criteria.
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to the next measure.
• Scheme #4: We retrieve data on firms’ commercial paper ratings and categorize as being
financially constrained those firms that never display any ratings during our sample period.
Observations from these firms are only assigned to the constrained subsample in the years
a positive debt is reported. Firms whose commercial papers receive ratings during our sam-
ple period are considered unconstrained. This approach follows from the work of Calomiris,
Himmelberg, and Wachtel (1995) on the characteristics of commercial paper issuers.
Table 1 reports the number of firm-years under each of the eight financial constraint categories
used in our analysis. According to the payout scheme, for example, there are 6,153 financially
constrained firm-years and 6,231 financially unconstrained firm-years. The table also shows the
extent to which the four classification schemes are related. For example, out of the 6,153 firm-years
classified as constrained according to the payout scheme, 2,680 are also constrained according to
the size scheme, while a smaller number, 1,078 firm-years, are classified as unconstrained. The
remaining firm-years represent payout-constrained firms that are neither constrained nor uncon-
strained according to size. In general, there is a positive correlation among the four measures of
financial constraints. For example, most small (large) firms lack (have) bond ratings. Also, most
small (large) firms have low (high) payout policies. However, the table also makes it clear that
these cross-group correlations are far from perfect.
− insert Table 1 here −
3.2.3 Measuring Hedging Needs
To identify firms that have a high need for hedging, we examine the relationship between firms’
free operating cash flows and a proxy for investment opportunities that is both exogenous to their
internal cash flow process and extraneous to our baseline empirical model (Eqs. (14) and (15)).
Note that we cannot look directly at the correlation between a firm’s cash flows and investment
spending, since the two are endogenously related when firms are financially constrained. The same
is true for the correlation between a firm’s cash flows and Q if the anticipation of a firm’s ability
to pursue profitable investment opportunities is already capitalized in its stock price. We consider
three alternative measures of investment opportunities that fit the above requirements, all of which
are based on industry-level proxies.
First, following the literature that links expenditures in product research and development to
investment opportunities (see, e.g., Graham (2000) and Fama and French (2002)), we look at the
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correlation between a firm’s cash flow from current operations (CashFlow) and its industry-level me-
dian of R&D expenditures to assess whether a firm’s availability of internal funds is correlated with
the firm’s demand for investment funds.18 We compute this correlation, firm by firm, identifying the
firm’s industry using its three-digit SIC code. We then partition our sample into firms displaying low
and high correlation between investment demand and supply of internal funds. To be precise, recall
that our theory has particularly clear implications for cash and debt policies of constrained firms at
the high and low ends of the correlation between cash flows and investment opportunities. Accord-
ingly, we assign to the group of “low hedging needs” those firms for which the empirical correlation
between cash flow and industry R&D is above 0.2, and to the group of “high hedging needs” those
firms for which this correlation is below —0.2. We emphasize that although these cut-offs may seem
arbitrary, they ensure that firms in either group have correlation coefficient estimates that are statis-
tically reliable.19 Moreover, our results are robust to changes in these cut-offs (e.g., ±0.1 or ±0.3).
The second measure of investment opportunities we consider is related to observed product-
market demand. Specifically, for each firm-year in the sample we compute the median three-year-
ahead sales growth rate in the firm’s three-digit SIC and then compute the correlation between
the firm’s cash flow and this measure of industry sales growth. The premise of this approach is
that firms’ perceived investment opportunities (and demand for investment funds) will be related
to estimates of future sales growth in their industries and that those estimates, on average, coincide
with the data. To be consistent with the first characterization of hedging needs, we also set cut-offs
for high and low hedging needs at correlation coefficients of 0.2 and —0.2, respectively.
The third measure we use to capture investment opportunities is somewhat closer to that con-
tained in our empirical model; we look at Q. Importantly, rather than relying on a firm’s industry
level of Q, which could be highly related to the firm’s Q itself (and recall, this is included in the
specification), we look at changes in the firm’s industry median Q. By looking at changes in in-
dustry Q we remove the fixed, level component of Q and yet retain a reasonably good proxy for
innovations in investment opportunities different firms face. Once again we use the ±0.2 cut-offs
for correlation coefficients between cash flow and this measure of investment opportunities when
assigning firms to low and high hedging needs groups.
18R&D expenditures are measured as COMPUSTAT item #46 divided by item #6. Recall, all of the firms in our
sample come from the manufacturing sector. Industries in this sector of the economy are relatively homogeneous in
a number of dimensions. We think of temporal, cross-industry differences in R&D expenditures as a phenomenon
that is correlated with the emergence of differential growth opportunities across industries (caused, for example, by
changes in consumer preferences and technological innovation).
19This point is important in that our sample, although large in the cross-section dimension, is limited in the
time series dimension (this is the dimension used to compute the correlation between firm-level cash flows and
industry-level investment opportunities).
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3.3 Sample Characteristics
To test our theory, we must identify groups of firms facing differential levels of financial constraints
and hedging needs. To our knowledge, no previous study has differentiated firms along both of
these dimensions. Hence, it is important that we highlight and discuss basic differences in firm
characteristics across constrained/unconstrained subsamples and low/high hedging needs subsam-
ples. Presenting these descriptive statistics is interesting in its own right, but it also helps us assess
the merits of candidate alternative explanations for our empirical results.
To recap, our analysis suggests four firm types based on the intersection of the degree of financial
constraints and the degree of hedging needs. And we consider four measures of financial constraints
and three measures of hedging needs. Thus, for every empirical variable we examine, the categoriza-
tion scheme yields 48 sets of statistics (4× 4× 3). In the interest of completeness and robustness, we
summarize each of the central empirical proxies used in our analysis across all possible categoriza-
tions. This summary is provided in Table 2, which reports mean, median, and number of observa-
tions for beginning-of-period long-term debt to asset ratio (Debt), beginning-of-period cash to asset
ratio (CashHold), net cash flow scaled by assets (CashFlow), the market-to-book asset ratio (Q),
and the net difference between debt issuance and repurchase scaled by assets (∆Debt). The table
also shows a standard measure of financial distress (Z-Score) in order to aid some of our discussion.20
Because our sampling approach and variable construction methods follow the extant literature,
it is not surprising that the numbers we report in Table 2 resemble those found in related studies
(see, e.g., Frank and Goyal (2003) and Almeida et al. (2004)). In particular, as in Frank and
Goyal, average leverage ratios fluctuate around 0.19 and average Q ’s hover around 1.6. The fig-
ures for net debt issues and cash flows are also comparable across the two papers; note, however,
that Frank and Goyal scale debt issuances by net (as opposed to total) assets. More importantly
for our purposes, note that there seems to be only limited evidence (at best) that any of these
proxies vary systematically across the four firm types we study. So, for example, constrained firms
seem to carry more debt according to some characterizations (e.g., based on payout policy), but
less according to others (e.g., size); with no significant variation between firms with high and low
hedging needs within the same constraint type. Consistent with intuition, some characterizations
suggest that constrained firms are more profitable and/or have higher growth opportunities (see
statistics for low dividend paying firms). However, notice that (1) these differences are not always
robust within and across the panels of Table 2, (2) differences are economically insignificant (e.g.,
Q ’s are overall very similar in economic terms across firm types), and (3) there are no systematic
20Here we use Altman’s “unleveraged” Z-Score measure, as also used by Frank and Goyal (2003), computed as
3.3×(item #170/item #6) + (item #12/item #6) + 1.4×(item #36/item #6) + 1.2×((item #4—item #5)/item #6).
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differences between constrained firms with high and low hedging needs (our main contrast groups).
In all, differences in investment opportunities and/or cash flows are unlikely to provide alternative
explanations for why joint cash and debt policies should vary across our four categories of firms.
− insert Table 2 here −
Statistics for cash holdings are similar to those in Almeida et al., whose study focuses on this
particular variable. As in their paper, we also find that constrained firms hold far more cash
on average than unconstrained firms. However, there is little systematic variation across firms
with different hedging needs. Finally, we consider differences in financial distress measures across
firms in our sample using Altman’s Z-Score. One could argue that financial distress alone may
drive differences in the way firms make their cash and debt choices. While we do not dispute this
hypothesis, it poses a challenge to our story only if we find that underlying patterns in the likelihood
of financial distress are systematically different across our four firm types. We have no priors as
to why financial distress will influence our assignment of firms in a systematic way, but we let the
data tell us if such a sample-selection bias exists. The second to last column in each of the panels A
though C in Table 2 reveals no systematic relation between financial constraints, hedging needs, and
financial distress. This is a reassuring finding that is consistent with unreported robustness checks
in which we show that the exclusion of firms with high risk of financial distress (Z-scores below 1.81
and interest coverage ratios below 1) from our 3SLS estimations does not affect our conclusions.
One aspect of our characterization of the data that is new to the literature regards the propen-
sity of firms to issue or repay debt given the financial constraints and investment opportunities
that they face. The mean and medians reported in the last column in each of the panels of Table
2 suggest that unconstrained firms, on net terms, seem to issue more debt than constrained firms.
However, these statistics reveal little about the frequency with which these firms approach capital
markets to raise additional debt or repay outstanding debt. In particular, if constrained firms rarely
act to modify the amount of debt outstanding when compared to unconstrained firms, then the debt
redemption and issuance channel of our theory could be deemed as empirically uninteresting.
In order to shed light on the frequency with which our sample firms tap the market for debt
securities, for each one of our four firm-types, we computed the number of firm-years for which
either no issuance or repurchase activity is registered, and also the number of firm-years in which
debt issues surpass repurchases, and vice-versa. In the interest of brevity we only report and discuss
these results in the text (the tables available upon request).
We find that the frequency with which constrained and unconstrained firms act on their own
debt accounts is not very different. The percentage of constrained firm-years that neither issue nor
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repurchase debt is roughly in the 3—6% range, while the percentage of unconstrained firms that also
do nothing to their debt accounts is in a similar 3—6% range. This shows that a large proportion
of firms in each one of our four firm groups is active in the debt markets. In addition, constrained
firms tend to make more trips to debt markets in order to repurchase debt (net repurchase activities
are registered by some 50 to 60% of the constrained firm-years), while unconstrained firms display
the opposite pattern (net issuance activities in the 47—53% range). In other words, while rejecting
the notion that constrained firms are largely inactive in the debt markets, our frequency tests reveal
that constrained firms issue debt somewhat less frequently than unconstrained firms and manage
their debt accounts with more frequent repurchase initiatives. Finally, we observe that the overall
frequency of debt issuances and repurchases varies little across the dimension of hedging needs.
3.4 Debt and Cash Policies across Constrained and Unconstrained Firms
Our testing approach requires us to compare the cash flow sensitivities of cash and debt estimated
from Eqs. (14) and (15) across groups of firms, sorted both on measures of constraints and of hedg-
ing needs. Before we do that, we present some preliminary regressions in which we consider only
the differences between constrained and unconstrained firms; i.e., without sorting on hedging needs.
The purpose of this is two-fold. First, it is interesting to see the average pattern of cash flow sen-
sitivities for unconstrained firms: this average pattern provides evidence on the net costs of cash
and debt in the absence of constraints and thus provides a benchmark against which to evaluate
the results obtained for constrained firms. Second, these regressions allow for direct comparisons
with previous papers in the literature on marginal financing decisions. While those papers do not
consider the hedging dimension we are exploring, it is important that we are able to replicate their
primary findings in our data.
Table 3 presents the results obtained from the estimation of our baseline regression system (Eqs.
(14) and (15)) within each sample partition described in Section 3.2.2. A total of 16 estimated re-
sults are reported in the table (2 equations × 4 constraint criteria × 2 firm-types for each constraint
criterion). Results from the debt regressions (in Panel A) make it clear that constrained firms have
no systematic tendency to change their debt positions following a cash flow innovation. This is
in sharp contrast to the policies of financially unconstrained firms. For each new dollar of excess
cash flow, an unconstrained firm will reduce the amount of debt it issues by approximately 25 to
33 cents – the cash flow sensitivities of debt for unconstrained firms are all significant at better
than the 1% test level. This negative relationship between cash flows and debt issues is consistent
with the findings of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), who report that debt issues are positively
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related to a firm’s financing deficit for the types of firms that we classify as unconstrained.21 In
turn, results from the cash regressions (Panel B) resemble those in Almeida et al. (2004). Under
each constraint criterion, the set of financially constrained firms display a significantly positive re-
lationship between excess cash flows and changes in cash holdings – their cash flow sensitivities of
cash are all significant at better than the 1% test level. Unconstrained firms, in contrast, do not
display any systematic propensity to save cash out of excess cash flows.
− insert Table 3 here −
As discussed in Section 2.3, our theory makes clearer predictions about the relationship between
cash flow sensitivities and hedging needs than about the average level of those sensitivities across
financial constraints alone. This is partly because the theory does not pin down the levels of the
sensitivities for unconstrained firms, and partly because the average level of the sensitivities for
constrained firms depends on the distribution of hedging needs within these firms. Nonetheless,
one can rationalize the “average” results from Table 3 as follows. Unconstrained firms seem to
display a preference towards using cash flows to reduce debt instead of holding cash in their balance
sheets. This finding indicates that holding cash is relatively costly for these firms, perhaps because
cash has low yield and/or it can be diverted by management (our examination need not take a
stand of these exact costs). In contrast, constrained firms choose to retain cash in spite of the fact
that cash may be relatively costly. This finding alone suggests that cash has a relevant economic
role to play when firms are financially constrained. Finally, the additional finding that debt is not
systematically related to cash flows for constrained firms suggests that these firms on average prefer
positive cash over negative debt.
To show that cash and debt policies of constrained firms are influenced by our theoretical pre-
dictions, we need to find evidence that these policies are significantly affected by hedging needs.
We tackle this issue in turn.
3.5 Debt and Cash Policies: Hedging Needs
The tests of this section consist of performing estimations of our 3SLS system across (double) par-
titions of constrained/unconstrained firms and firms with low/high hedging needs. Table 4 reports
the results from those system estimations, separately for constrained firms (Panel A) and uncon-
strained firms (Panel B). The table features our first proxy for investment opportunities, industry
21Note that Shyam-Sunder and Myers do not consider contrasts between constrained and unconstrained firms.
However, their sample selection scheme ensures that only large firms with rated debt enter the sample, hence their
results can be compared with our debt regressions for unconstrained firms.
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R&D expenditures, in the computation of the correlation between a firm’s cash flows and the invest-
ment opportunities it faces. Table 5 is similarly compiled, but the results there employ our second
measure of growth opportunities, industry sales growth. Finally, Table 6 presents the same sorts of
regression outputs, but it employs changes in industry Q as the proxy for investment opportunities.
For ease of exposition, we only present estimates of the cash flow sensitivities of cash and debt in
the 3SLS system, α1 and β1, respectively.
− insert Table 4 here −
− insert Table 5 here −
− insert Table 6 here −
Results in Tables 4 through 6 are all very similar. As in previous estimations, unconstrained
firms display a strong, negative cash flow sensitivity of debt – they use their free cash flow to pay
down debt – and their cash policies are completely insensitive to cash flow innovations. Impor-
tantly, these patterns are largely unrelated to measures of hedging needs. To be precise, the cash flow
sensitivities of cash are insignificant for the vast majority of unconstrained firm subsamples (both
those with low and those with high hedging needs). And while cash flow sensitivities of debt are
sometimes more negative for firms with low hedging needs, the reverse pattern occurs with almost
the same frequency. Overall, the estimates from regressions for unconstrained firms suggest that
there is no systematic relationship between hedging needs and either of the cash flow sensitivities.
The inferences are strikingly different for constrained firms. The results show that constrained
firms with high hedging needs are the ones paying down debt the least – in fact their net borrowing
positions increase – and are also the ones doing the most cash savings. In contrast, constrained
firms with low hedging needs display a tendency to pay down their outstanding debt when they
have cash flow surpluses, a pattern that is similar (but weaker in magnitude) to that observed for
unconstrained firms. In a handful of specifications (see Table 6), constrained firms with low hedging
needs seem to have a propensity to save cash. But this pattern is far from robust. In Tables 4 and
5, for example, the cash flow sensitivities of cash are never significant for constrained firms with
low hedging needs.
We also report the p-values of the differences in cash flow sensitivities of cash and debt within
constrained and unconstrained subsamples (i.e., across hedging needs subsamples). The main pat-
tern is clear, and independent of the specific correlation measure. Constrained firms with high
hedging needs have higher cash flow sensitivities of cash, and less negative cash flow sensitivities of
debt than constrained firms with low hedging needs.
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Overall, the results from Tables 4 through 6 are fully consistent with the predictions of our
model. Constrained firms do have a much stronger propensity to save cash out of cash flows, and a
much weaker propensity to reduce debt when their hedging needs are high. This pattern suggests
that future investment needs, jointly with expectations about the availability of internal funds, are
key determinants of these firms’ financial policies. The fact that unconstrained firms do not dis-
play such patterns gives additional evidence that these patterns are indeed produced by the joint,
dynamic optimization of financing and investment that characterizes constrained firms’ policies.
4 Concluding Remarks
We propose and test a theory of cash—debt substitutability in the presence of financing constraints.
Our results show that cash cannot be treated as negative debt for constrained firms, particularly
for those with high hedging needs. These firms prefer to allocate excess cash flows into cash hold-
ings. In contrast, constrained firms with low hedging needs prefer to use excess cash flows towards
reducing outstanding debt, thereby “saving” future borrowing capacity.
Our results suggest that there is an important hedging dimension to standard financial policies
such as cash and debt management in the presence of financing frictions. While the link between
hedging and financing constraints was previously identified by Froot et al. (1993), the implications
of this link for cash and debt policies had hitherto not been studied. In looking at cash and debt
balances as hedging devices, we find evidence of activities by real-world firms that are fully con-
sistent with the theoretical link between hedging and financing constraints. Such a match between
theory and evidence has often eluded those researchers who focus on the use of derivatives as hedg-
ing tools. We also identify an empirical counterpart for the notion of hedging demand. Based on
the correlation between firm-level cash flows and industry-level investment opportunities, our study
suggests various easy-to-implement measures of “hedging needs.”
As we discuss in the Introduction, there are two possible characterizations of the view of “cash
as negative debt.” First, firms could simply be indifferent between having more cash or less debt in
their balance sheets. Second, cash can be seen as the negative of debt when firms use cash to reduce
debt. Our theory suggests that under the first characterization, cash can only be negative debt if
firms are financially unconstrained and no other frictions cause firms to prefer negative debt over
positive cash, and vice-versa. The existence of financial constraints, in particular, eliminates the
indifference between cash and (negative) debt because these two components of a firm’s financial
structure have different implications for firms’ feasible investment spending. Concerning the sec-
ond characterization, our paper gives a more involved answer. Specifically, cash can be viewed as
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negative debt even for constrained firms if their hedging needs are low: these firms should display
a preference towards using cash to reduce debt. In contrast, cash will not be used to reduce debt
by constrained firms with high hedging needs. For these firms, the value of cash inside the firm is
higher than when it is used to reduce debt.
Our analysis focused mostly on the substitution effect between cash and debt among financially
constrained firms. However, our finding that financially unconstrained firms, too, display a system-
atic preference for using excess cash flows to reduce debt suggests that other considerations are at
play in the data. These considerations could include, for example, issues such as the yield on cash
relative to the firm’s effective borrowing cost and the diversion of free cash flows by management.
Future research should try to identify the effects of tax parameters, agency problems, and liquidity
premiums, among others, on the substitutability between cash and debt in financial policy-making.
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Appendix
A Other Costs and Benefits of Cash vs. Debt
We introduce a parameter k to capture in a simplified way other (net) costs and benefits of cash and debt. We assume
that holding a unit of cash for a period yields a return of (1 − k) next period. For example, given the level of cash
retained in period 0, c1 = c0 −∆, the cash available for the firm in period 1 is (1 − k)c1. If, for example, cash has
a low yield as a consequence of its liquidity, the parameter k would be positive. Variables that favor debt issues and
cash retention (possibly related to tax considerations) could be captured by a negative k.
A.1 Solution when k > 0
A.1.1 Unconstrained Firms
A cost of holding cash means that unconstrained firms will no longer be indifferent between holding cash and repaying
debt. In fact, it becomes optimal for such firms to carry as little cash as possible, given that cash does not increase
investment for such firms.
In order to show this, we start by characterizing optimal decisions at date 1, for a given ∆. For a given ∆, the
firm has an amount of cash equal to (1−k)(c0−∆) available at that date. In the states in which there is no investment
opportunity, the optimal strategy is to pay out this cash so that the firm does not carry it again into period 2. In
the states in which there is an investment opportunity, it is optimal for unconstrained firms to issue as little debt
as possible, so that less cash is carried into period 2. Given that the unconstrained firm invests IFB if there is an
investment opportunity, and given the firm’s budget constraint at date 1, we have that the optimal debt issue B∗1 in
states in which there is an investment opportunity satisfies
IFB = (1− k)(c0 −∆) +B∗1 .
If B1 = B∗1 , the firm carries no cash from date 1 to date 2 in states in which an investment opportunity arises.
Given these date 1 decisions, the firm’s expected equity value at date 0 can be written as
pφ[cH + g(IFB)−B∗1 − d
N
2 ] + p(1− φ)[cH + (1− k)(c0 −∆)− d
N
2 ] +
(1− p)φ[cL + (1− k)(c0 −∆)− τcL] + (1− p)(1− φ)[cL + g(IFB)−B∗1 − τcL].
The firm’s objective is to choose∆ to maximize this expression, an optimization problem which using the definition
of B∗1 and the relationship between d
N
2 and ∆ can be written as
max
∆
[∆+ (1− k)(c0 −∆)].
Clearly, as long as k > 0, and conditional on the firm being unconstrained the firm benefits from increasing ∆ as
much as possible. Thus, the optimal solution for ∆, ∆∗, is such that:
∆
∗ ≥ e∆ = min(∆max,∆
0
),
where ∆
0
is the value of ∆ that renders the firm constrained in state L. ∆
0
satisfies:
∆
0
= c0 −
[IFB − τg(IFB)]
(1− k) .
If ∆
0
< ∆max, we cannot guarantee that ∆∗ = ∆
0
exactly. The problem is that it might be worthwhile for the firm
to become somewhat constrained in state L given the benefit of reducing debt and carrying less cash. The optimal
value of ∆ is somewhere between ∆
0
and ∆max. In any case, we have the result that the cash flow sensitivity of debt
should be negative in this case. Both ∆
0
and ∆max are increasing with c0, and thus an increase in c0 reduces the
amount of debt that the firm carries into the future. (Here it helps again to assume that c0 < D0, so that ∆max = c0).
The intuition for the sensitivity result is simple. An increase in cash flow either allows the firm to repay more
debt directly, or indirectly through a relaxation of the financial constraint in state L, in case this constraint becomes
binding. Notice also that even though we have a negative relationship between cash flow and debt for unconstrained
firms in this case, this relationship should hold irrespective of the correlation between cash flows and investment
opportunities (∆∗ is independent of φ).
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A.1.2 Constrained Firms
The introduction of a cost of holding cash does not change the qualitative nature of the results obtained for the
constrained firms. First, for constrained firms that choose to repay debt when k = 0, there is obviously no change in
behavior. Second, because the cost of carrying cash increases, the only change in the result characterized in Propo-
sition 1 is that the threshold φ below which it is optimal for the constrained firm not to repay any debt should be
lower, and decreasing with k.
A.2 Solution when k < 0
A.2.1 Unconstrained Firms
A negative cost of carrying cash translates into a benefit of allowing debt to be as high as possible, with the additional
proceeds parked in the cash account. A similar reasoning to that described above shows that the unconstrained firm
benefits from issuing debt at date 0, that is:
∆
∗ = ∆min.
By definition, the firm can only be unconstrained if it is unconstrained in state L when ∆ = ∆min, so now there is a
uniquely optimal value for ∆.
Since c1 = c0−∆min for such firms, we get the implication that an increase in cash flow should result in higher cash
savings for unconstrained firms. Notice that ∆min is independent of cash flow. Again, this implication is independent
of the correlation between cash flows and investment opportunities.
A.2.2 Constrained Firms
As in the analysis of the previous case, there is no qualitative change in the implications for constrained firms. The
only change is that the threshold above which the firm finds it profitable to repay debt in Proposition 1 will increase.
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B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 Consider (3) when that expression is an equality. Differentiating both sides with respect to I, we
obtain
[1− τg0(I)]I0 = −1 + ∂
∂∆
k
τc2 − d
N
2
l+
. (16)
It is our maintained assumption that [1−τg0(I)] is greater than zero. From Eq. (10), if ∆ > h∆, then τcH > τcL > d
N
2
and [τc2 − d
N
2 ]
+ = τc2 −D0 +∆. It follows that in this case, IH(∆) and IL(∆) are independent of ∆.
When ∆ < h∆, τcH ≥ dN2 > τcL. Hence, [τcH − d
N
2 ]
+ = τcH − d2 + ∆p and [τcL − d
N
2 ]
+ = 0. It follows that in
this case, IH(∆) is strictly increasing in ∆ and IL(∆) is strictly decreasing in ∆.
Finally, note that for a given state s, I∗s (∆) is either equal to I
FB , which is independent of ∆, or equal to Is(∆).
The lemma now follows from the properties of Is(∆) derived above. ♦
Proof of Lemma 2 From Eq. (3), note that for a given ∆, if the firm is unconstrained in state L, then
IFB > c0 −∆+ τg(IFB) +
k
τcL − d
N
2
l+
. (17)
Since cH > cL, this inequality must also hold with cL replaced by cH , and in turn, the firm must be unconstrained in
state H as well. Furthermore, from Lemma 1, I∗L(∆) is weakly decreasing in ∆. Hence, if the firm is unconstrained
in state L at ∆ = ∆min, then the firm is always financially unconstrained. ♦
Proof of Proposition 1 Consider first a firm that is financially unconstrained. From Lemma 2, when the firm is
unconstrained, it must be unconstrained in state L at the lowest possible value of ∆, I∗L(∆min) = I
FB. From Lemma
2, I∗L(∆) is weakly decreasing in∆, so that for∆ > ∆min, I
∗
L(∆) ≤ I∗L(∆min) and the firm may be rendered constrained
if it becomes constrained in state L. Denote e∆ as the minimum of ∆max and the maximum value of ∆ for which
I∗L(∆) = I
FB . It follows that for ∆ ∈ [∆min, e∆], the firm is unconstrained and hence indifferent in picking any policy
∆. For ∆ > e∆, the firm is rendered constrained in state L which can only reduce firm value.
Consider now a firm that is financially constrained for all ∆. In this case, the firm solves the maximization
problem in (13) and I∗s (∆) = Is(∆), the constrained investment levels given by (3). Consider first the effect of
“small” increases in ∆, such that τcL < dN2 after the debt repayment. In this case, the first-order condition for an
interior solution of ∆ is
(1− p)

φ(g0H − 1)
(1− τg0H)
− (1− φ)(g
0
L − 1)
(1− τg0L)

= 0,
where we have substituted the derivatives
∂IH
∂∆0
=
(1− p)
p(1− τg0H)
,
∂IL
∂∆0
= − 1
(1− τg0L)
.
For any given ∆, we clearly have that IH ≥ IL, and in turn, g0H ≤ g0L, implying that
(g0H − 1)
(1− τg0H)
≤ (g
0
L − 1)
(1− τg0L)
.
In particular, for φ ≤ 0.5, the left hand side of the first-order condition is always negative, whereby ∆∗ = ∆min. At
φ = 1, it is always positive whereby ∆∗ = min(h∆,∆max). This last step follows from the fact that once the debt
repayment is “large” (equal to h∆), the debt becomes riskless and a further increase in debt repayment does not affect
the objective function. To see this, note that Eqs. (3) and (10) for τcL > dN2 imply that
IH = c0 + τg(IH) + τcH −D0 (18)
IL = c0 + τg(IL) + τcL −D0. (19)
Next, we show that whenever ∆∗ is interior, it is increasing in φ. Then, the existence of unique φ and φ follows
by the intermediate-value theorem.
Denoting the objective function in (13) by f(∆), we obtain that at the optimal ∆∗,
∂f
∂∆
= 0,
∂2f
∂∆2
< 0.
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By the implicit-function theorem, that is, taking derivative of the first order condition w.r.t. φ, we obtain
sign

d∆
dφ

= sign

∂2f
∂φ∂∆

.
Now,
∂f
∂∆
= (1− p)

φ(g0H − 1)
(1− τg0H)
− (1− φ)(g
0
L − 1)
(1− τg0L)

.
Thus,
∂2f
∂φ∂∆
= (1− p)

(g0H − 1)
(1− τg0H)
+
(g0L − 1)
(1− τg0L)

> 0.
This completes the proof. ♦
Proof of Proposition 2 For φ ≤ 1
2
, ∆∗ = ∆min, which is independent of c0. Since c1 = c0 − ∆, it follows that for
φ ≤ 12 ,
∂c1
∂c0
> 0 and ∂∆∂c0 = 0.
For φ ≥ φ, ∆∗ = min(h∆,∆max). Since h∆ is independent of c0 and ∆max = min(c0,D0) is weakly increasing in c0,
we obtain that for ∂∆∂c0 > 0. When the relevant parameter range is ∆
∗ = c0, then we also obtain that ∂c1∂c0 = 0. ♦
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Table 1: Constraint Type Cross-Correlations
This table displays constraint type cross-classifications for the four criteria used to categorize firm-years as
either financially constrained or unconstrained (see text for full details). To ease visualization, we assign
the letter (C) for constrained firms and (U) for unconstrained firms in each row/column. All data are from
the annual COMPUSTAT industrial tapes and the sample period is 1971 through 2001.
Financial Constraints Criteria Payout Policy Firm Size Bond Ratings CP Ratings
(C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U)
1. Payout Policy
Constrained Firms (C) 6,153
Unconstrained Firms (U) 6,231
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms (C) 2,680 1,221 6,060
Unconstrained Firms (U) 1,078 2,645 6,231
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms (C) 2,605 2,190 4,217 922 7,953
Unconstrained Firms (U) 3,548 4,041 1,843 5,309 12,193
4. Commercial Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms (C) 4,920 3,229 5,763 1,781 7,689 5,254 12,943
Unconstrained Firms (U) 1,233 3,002 297 4,450 264 6,939 7,203
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Financial Constrainsts and Hedging Needs
This table displays summary statistics for beginning-of-period long-term debt (Debt), beginning-of-period
holdings of cash and liquid securities (CashHold), current cash flows (CashF low), market-to-book asset ratio
(Q), unleveraged Altman’s Z-score, and net debt issuance (∆Debt) across groups of financially constrained
and unconstrained firms and firms with high versus low hedging needs. Hedging needs are measured based on
the correlation between a firm’s cash flow and various industry-level proxies for investment opportunities (these
alternative measures are used in Panels A through C). All data are from the annual COMPUSTAT industrial
tapes and the sample period is 1971 through 2001.
Panel A: Hedging needs based on the correlation between firm cash flows and industry R&D
V ariable
Mean
[Median]
Debt CashHold CashF low Q Z-Score ∆Debt
Financial Constraints Hedging Needs
Criteria
1. Payout Policy
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1968 0.1337 0.0201 1.5284 2.0386 0.0111
(N= 2,537) [0.1791] [0.0830] [0.0329] [1.1906] [2.1758] [—0.0008]
Low Hedging Needs 0.2135 0.1447 0.0320 1.6361 2.0692 0.0096
(N= 1,585) [0.1991] [0.0990] [0.0385] [1.2541] [2.1354] [—0.0019]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1686 0.0845 0.0186 1.3758 2.4610 0.0133
(N= 2,459) [0.1590] [0.0564] [0.0161] [1.1408] [2.4076] [—0.0001]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1703 0.0976 0.0242 1.5985 2.4272 0.0164
(N= 1,467) [0.1672] [0.0601] [0.0228] [1.1802] [2.3867] [0.0000]
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1478 0.1710 0.0315 1.5817 2.6141 0.0095
(N= 2,468) [0.1189] [0.1352] [0.0426] [1.3050] [2.7545] [—0.0023]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1494 0.1787 0.0414 1.6500 2.5550 0.0063
(N= 1,574) [0.1229] [0.1238] [0.0450] [1.2693] [2.6696] [—0.0030]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1771 0.0743 0.0196 1.3420 2.1383 0.0119
(N= 2,427) [0.1671] [0.0525] [0.0202] [1.1307] [2.1401] [0.0006]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1868 0.0938 0.0324 1.6882 2.1742 0.0125
(N= 1,545) [0.1828] [0.0699] [0.0305] [1.2715] [2.2180] [0.0016]
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1492 0.1334 0.0301 1.4189 2.6305 0.0075
(N= 3,351) [0.1334] [0.0940] [0.0342] [1.1470] [2.6839] [—0.0018]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1536 0.1371 0.0367 1.5030 2.5729 0.0080
(N= 2,294) [0.1400] [0.0947] [0.0365] [1.1556] [2.6157] [—0.0019]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1908 0.0861 0.0266 1.4598 2.2460 0.0141
(N= 4,576) [0.1771] [0.0573] [0.0290] [1.2147] [2.2777] [0.0000]
Low Hedging Needs 0.2032 0.1020 0.0360 1.7106 2.1966 0.0150
(N= 2,754) [0.1894] [0.0694] [0.0370] [1.3326] [2.2066] [0.0000]
4. Commercial Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1788 0.1245 0.0255 1.3877 2.4129 0.0110
(N= 5,124) [0.1632] [0.0832] [0.0305] [1.1457] [2.4785] [—0.0015]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1854 0.1296 0.0346 1.5131 2.3557 0.0111
(N= 3,391) [0.1707] [0.0870] [0.0354] [1.1864] [2.4188] [—0.0013]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1654 0.0740 0.0328 1.5428 2.4022 0.0119
(N= 2,803) [0.1553] [0.0528] [0.0322] [1.2656] [2.3766] [0.0000]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1735 0.0952 0.0397 1.8272 2.3947 0.0134
(N= 1,657) [0.1673] [0.0692] [0.0394] [1.4117] [2.3262] [0.0004]
Table 2: – Continued
Panel B: Hedging needs based on the correlation between firm cash flows and industry Sales Growth
V ariable
Mean
[Median]
Debt CashHold CashF low Q Z-Score ∆Debt
Financial Constraints Hedging Needs
Criteria
1. Payout Policy
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.2118 0.1338 0.0201 1.5537 2.0189 0.0114
(N= 2,039) [0.1909] [0.0860] [0.0357] [1.2017] [2.1566] [—0.0016]
Low Hedging Needs 0.2137 0.1572 0.0233 1.6970 1.9567 0.0142
(N= 1,622) [0.1886] [0.0979] [0.0326] [1.2807] [2.0396] [—0.0010]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1834 0.0860 0.0202 1.3779 2.3732 0.0140
(N= 2,127) [0.1782] [0.0580] [0.0179] [1.1609] [2.3169] [0.0000]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1685 0.0944 0.0218 1.6206 2.4605 0.0154
(N= 1,510) [0.1596] [0.0619] [0.0221] [1.1922] [2.3971] [0.0000]
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1493 0.1629 0.0343 1.5772 2.5916 0.0080
(N= 2,276) [0.1253] [0.1193] [0.0434] [1.2775] [2.7400] [—0.0032]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1518 0.1879 0.0344 1.7570 2.4955 0.0098
(N= 1,579) [0.1190] [0.1423] [0.0409] [1.3342] [2.6032] [—0.0023]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.2106 0.0737 0.0215 1.3881 2.0033 0.0128
(N= 2,107) [0.2059] [0.0506] [0.0231] [1.1572] [2.0264] [0.0013]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1737 0.0879 0.0286 1.6739 2.2410 0.0132
(N= 1,428) [0.1661] [0.0573] [0.0285] [1.2668] [2.2474] [0.0000]
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1486 0.1309 0.0329 1.4314 2.5899 0.0073
(N= 2,980) [0.1364] [0.0971] [0.0359] [1.1559] [2.6736] [—0.0021]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1543 0.1495 0.0324 1.5466 2.5159 0.0087
(N= 2,196) [0.1371] [0.1007] [0.0334] [1.1721] [2.5257] [—0.0016]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.2114 0.0883 0.0268 1.4835 2.1873 0.0156
(N= 3,801) [0.2024] [0.0566] [0.0305] [1.2399] [2.1511] [0.0000]
Low Hedging Needs 0.2047 0.0969 0.0319 1.7057 2.2320 0.0155
(N= 2,836) [0.1857] [0.0620] [0.0356] [1.3328] [2.2763] [0.0000]
4. Commercial Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1822 0.1229 0.0278 1.4249 2.3533 .0115
(N= 4,643) [0.1658] [0.0851] [0.0325] [1.1595] [2.4489] [—0.0016]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1916 0.1339 0.0285 1.5156 2.3326 0.0125
(N= 3,392) [0.1733] [0.0853] [0.0314] [1.1828] [2.3779] [—0.0011]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1892 0.0739 0.0332 1.5380 2.3922 0.0129
(N= 2,138) [0.1831] [0.0516] [0.0337] [1.3102] [2.2707] [0.0000]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1674 0.0923 0.0396 1.8858 2.4063 0.0126
(N= 1,640) [0.1535] [0.0618] [0.0407] [1.4789] [2.4018] [0.0000]
Table 2: – Continued
Panel C: Hedging needs based on the correlation between firm cash flows and industry Q
V ariable
Mean
[Median]
Debt CashHold CashF low Q Z-Score ∆Debt
Financial Constraints Hedging Needs
Criteria
1. Payout Policy
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.2295 0.1272 0.0191 1.5121 1.9925 0.0105
(N= 1,661) [0.2053] [0.0781] [0.0303] [1.1693] [2.0887] [—0.0018]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1944 0.1657 0.0262 1.7417 1.9896 0.0119
(N= 1,288) [0.1625] [0.1156] [0.0338] [1.2919] [2.0932] [—0.0027]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1865 0.0842 0.0147 1.3053 2.3894 0.0146
(N= 1,661) [0.1821] [0.0547] [0.0139] [1.0686] [2.3538] [0.0000]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1724 0.0934 0.0270 1.5417 2.5325 0.0174
(N= 1,041) [0.1644] [0.0570] [0.0271] [1.2261] [2.5383] [0.0000]
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1637 0.1620 0.0347 1.5684 2.6271 0.0080
(N= 1,631) [0.1414] [0.1160] [0.0414] [1.2532] [2.7018] [—0.0034]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1469 0.1789 0.0414 1.7364 2.5776 0.0073
(N= 1,638) [0.1122] [0.1382] [0.0457] [1.3621] [2.7309] [—0.0027]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.2071 0.0702 0.0178 1.2892 2.0687 0.0129
(N= 1,730) [0.2003] [0.0466] [0.0202] [1.0887] [2.0809] [0.0009]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1862 0.0769 0.0300 1.6222 2.0990 0.0178
(N= 808) [0.1707] [0.0493] [0.0328] [1.3651] [2.1578] [0.0017]
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1552 0.1275 0.0320 1.4176 2.6238 0.0097
(N= 2,329) [0.1482] [0.0896] [0.0334] [1.1117] [2.6813] [—0.0016]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1545 0.1402 0.0386 1.5266 2.6382 0.0063
(N= 1,845) [0.1379] [0.0936] [0.0379] [1.1794] [2.6985] [—0.0030]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.2214 0.0844 0.0227 1.4035 2.1455 0.0138
(N= 3,048) [0.2043] [0.0520] [0.0265] [1.1677] [2.1976] [0.0000]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1980 0.1118 0.0327 1.7074 2.1965 0.0178
(N= 2,045) [0.1756] [0.0712] [0.0378] [1.3974] [2.2788] [0.0000]
4. Commercial Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1940 0.1208 0.0273 1.4093 2.3904 0.0128
(N= 3,757) [0.1779] [0.0786] [0.0306] [1.1229] [2.4754] [—0.0013]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1832 0.1431 0.0335 1.5880 2.4074 0.0114
(N= 2,804) [0.1632] [0.0956] [0.0357] [1.2312] [2.5123] [—0.0020]
Unconstrained Firms High Hedging Needs 0.1924 0.0646 0.0255 1.4104 2.2710 0.0102
(N= 1,620) [0.1807] [0.0451] [0.0274] [1.1856] [2.2647] [0.0000]
Low Hedging Needs 0.1664 0.0824 0.0405 1.7086 2.4086 0.0148
(N= 1,086) [0.1529] [0.0539] [0.0418] [1.4496] [2.3794] [0.0000]
Table 3: The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Debt and Cash Holdings
This table displays 3SLS-FE (firm and year effects) results of empirical models for debt issuance and cash holdings (see Eqs. (14) and
(15) in the text). Panel A displays the results for long-term debt issuance (net of repurchases), while Panel B displays the results for
changes in the holdings of cash and liquid securities. All data are from the annual COMPUSTAT industrial tapes and the sample period
is 1971 through 2001. The debt and cash models are jointly estimated (within constraint types) and the empirical error structure allows
for unstructured correlation across models. t-statistics (in parentheses).
Panel A: Cash Flow Sensitivity of Debt (Net Debt Issuance)
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 N
∆Debti,t CashFlowi,t Qi,t Sizei,t ∆CashHoldi,t Debti,t−1
Financial Constraints Criteria
1. Payout Policy
Constrained Firms 0.0148 —0.0077** 0.0306** 0.0980 —0.2393** 0.11 3,338
(0.57) (—3.26) (9.40) (1.63) (—16.49)
Unconstrained Firms —0.3531** 0.0004 0.0384** 0.1464** —0.3301** 0.16 3,835
(—21.03) (0.20) (12.32) (2.77) (—21.05)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms —0.0037 —0.0072** 0.0365** —0.0011 —0.2720** 0.11 3,043
(—0.13) (—3.16) (9.40) (—0.02) (—17.11)
Unconstrained Firms —0.2408** —0.0031* 0.0240** 0.2829** —0.2493** 0.10 4,023
(—11.29) (—1.93) (10.41) (3.24) (—19.02)
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.0642** —0.0114** 0.0330** 0.0060 —0.2629** 0.11 3,844
(2.74) (—6.50) (9.40) (0.14) (—17.70)
Unconstrained Firms —0.2330** —0.0007 0.0240** 0.1214** —0.2708** 0.13 7,836
(—13.50) (—0.49) (10.41) (2.54) (—28.89)
4. Commercial Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms —0.0633** —0.0044 0.0344** 0.0359 —0.2636** 0.11 7,039
(—3.43) (—2.78) (15.42) (0.92) (—25.94)
Unconstrained Firms —0.3183** —0.0026 0.0262** 0.2113** —0.2811** 0.14 4,641
(—14.79) (—1.61) (10.93) (2.91) (—22.31)
Notes: *,** indicate statistical significance at the 5- and 1-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 3: – Continued
Panel B: Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash Holdings
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 N
∆CashHoldi,t CashFlowi,t Qi,t Sizei,t ∆Debti,t CashHoldi,t−1
Financial Constraints Criteria
1. Payout Policy
Constrained Firms 0.1666** 0.0100** -0.0085** 0.1826** —0.3221** 0.12 3,338
(8.37) (5.09) (—2.82) (3.72) (—20.05)
Unconstrained Firms —0.0088 0.0016 —0.0039 —0.0344 —0.3908** 0.20 3,835
(—0.54) (1.35) (—1.84) (—1.16) (—30.78)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms 0.2201** 0.0064** —0.0154** 0.1593** —0.3323** 0.14 3,043
(9.26) (2.85) (—3.69) (2.84) (—19.89)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0026 0.0033** —0.0042** 0.0326 —0.2385** 0.09 4,023
(0.19) (3.53) (—2.90) (1.05) (—19.52)
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.1873** 0.0059** —0.0072* 0.0770 —0.3439** 0.15 3,844
(8.56) (3.20) (—2.09) (1.39) (—23.26)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0369* 0.0049** —0.0084** 0.1002** —0.2951** 0.11 7,836
(2.21) (4.89) (—5.82) (4.34) (—31.12)
4. Commercial Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.1422** 0.0073** —0.0091** 0.1422** —0.3290** 0.13 7,039
(4.50) (5.59) (—4.42) (4.50) (—31.27)
Unconstrained Firms —0.0061 0.0032* —0.0069** —0.0061 —0.2702** 0.10 4,641
(—0.22) (3.13) (—4.25) (—0.22) (—22.23)
Notes: *,** indicate statistical significance at the 5- and 1-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 4: Hedging Needs (Industry-Level R&D Measure) and the Propensity
to Save Cash vs Pay Down Debt
This table reports 3SLS-FE (firm and year effects) results of empirical models for debt issuance and cash holdings (see Eqs. (14)
and (15) in the text). Each cell displays estimates of the coefficient returned for CashF low (and the associated test statistics)
separately for sets of firms with high hedging needs and for sets of firms with low hedging needs. Panel A displays the results
returned for financially constrained firms, while Panel B displays the results for financially unconstrained firms. All data are
from the annual COMPUSTAT industrial tapes and the sample period is 1971 through 2001. The debt and cash models are
jointly estimated (within constraint types) and the empirical error structure allows for unstructured correlation across models.
t-statistics (in parentheses).
Panel A: Constrained Firms
Financial Constraints Criteria
Payout Policy Firm Size Bond Ratings CP Ratings
Endogenous Policy Variable:
1. Debt Issuance (Net of Retirements)
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs 0.0874* 0.0568 0.1518** 0.0642*
(2.25) (1.40) (3.88) (2.26)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs —0.1071* —0.1365* —0.0812* —0.2788**
(—2.03) (—2.30) (—2.00) (—8.42)
P -Value of Diff. High—Low Hedging [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00]
2. Increases in Cash Holdings
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs 0.2011** 0.2571** 0.2532** 0.1852**
(7.44) (8.51) (7.18) (8.70)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs 0.0481 0.0605 0.0987 0.0514
(0.97) (0.92) (1.95) (1.42)
P -Value of Diff. High—Low Hedging [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00]
Notes: *,** indicate statistical significance at the 5- and 1-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 4: – Continued
Panel B: Unconstrained Firms
Financial Constraints Criteria
Payout Policy Firm Size Bond Ratings CP Ratings
Endogenous Policy Variable:
1. Debt Issuance (Net of Retirements)
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs —0.4277** —0.1822** —0.1712** —0.4650**
(—9.27) (—3.50) (—5.86) (—10.85)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs —0.5514** —0.1565** —0.3680** —0.2071**
(—12.75) (—2.79) (—9.74) (—3.14)
P -Value of Diff. High—Low Hedging [0.05] [0.74] [0.00] [0.00]
2. Increases in Cash Holdings
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs 0.0356 0.0526 0.1087** —0.0157
(1.12) (1.63) (5.75) (—0.47)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs 0.0198 —0.0603 —0.0396 —0.0976*
(0.28) (—1.63) (—1.11) (—2.00)
P -Value of Diff. High—Low Hedging [0.84] [0.02] [0.00] [0.17]
Notes: *,** indicate statistical significance at the 5- and 1-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 5: Hedging Needs (Industry-Level Sales Growth Measure) and the
Propensity to Save Cash vs Pay Down Debt
This table reports 3SLS-FE (firm and year effects) results of empirical models for debt issuance and cash holdings (see Eqs. (14)
and (15) in the text). Each cell displays estimates of the coefficient returned for CashF low (and the associated test statistics)
separately for sets of firms with high hedging needs and for sets of firms with low hedging needs. Panel A displays the results
returned for financially constrained firms, while Panel B displays the results for financially unconstrained firms. All data are
from the annual COMPUSTAT industrial tapes and the sample period is 1971 through 2001. The debt and cash models are
jointly estimated (within constraint types) and the empirical error structure allows for unstructured correlation across models.
t-statistics (in parentheses).
Panel A: Constrained Firms
Financial Constraints Criteria
Payout Policy Firm Size Bond Ratings CP Ratings
Endogenous Policy Variable:
1. Debt Issuance (Net of Retirements)
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs 0.1380** 0.1112** 0.1921** 0.1084**
(3.58) (2.61) (5.51) (3.89)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs —0.1888** —0.1768** —0.1125* —0.3041**
(—3.79) (—3.38) (—2.34) (—8.66)
P -Value of Diff. High—Low Hedging [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
2. Increases in Cash Holdings
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs 0.1997* 0.2662** 0.2180** 0.1924**
(3.99) (4.44) (3.97) (3.96)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs 0.0722 0.0526 0.0185 0.0834
(1.26) (0.73) (0.24) (1.95)
P -Value of Diff. High—Low Hedging [0.09] [0.02] [0.03] [0.09]
Notes: *,** indicate statistical significance at the 5- and 1-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 5: – Continued
Panel B: Unconstrained Firms
Financial Constraints Criteria
Payout Policy Firm Size Bond Ratings CP Ratings
Endogenous Policy Variable:
1. Debt Issuance (Net of Retirements)
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs —0.3537** —0.2966** —0.1690** —0.3996**
(—9.93) (—8.87) (—5.96) (—11.11)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs —0.5718** —0.1577* —0.4109** —0.3883**
(—12.85) (—2.12) (—11.76) (—7.23)
P -Value of Diff. High—Low Hedging [0.00] [0.10] [0.00] [0.86]
2. Increases in Cash Holdings
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs —0.0586 0.0436 0.0607 0.0171
(—1.29) (1.45) (1.35) (0.44)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs 0.0042 0.0335 0.0604 —0.0875
(0.10) (0.45) (1.34) (—0.90)
P -Value of Diff. High—Low Hedging [0.30] [0.90] [1.00] [0.32]
Notes: *,** indicate statistical significance at the 5- and 1-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 6: Hedging Needs (Industry-Level Q Measure) and the Propensity to
Save Cash vs Pay Down Debt
This table reports 3SLS-FE (firm and year effects) results of empirical models for debt issuance and cash holdings (see Eqs. (14)
and (15) in the text). Each cell displays estimates of the coefficient returned for CashF low (and the associated test statistics)
separately for sets of firms with high hedging needs and for sets of firms with low hedging needs. Panel A displays the results
returned for financially constrained firms, while Panel B displays the results for financially unconstrained firms. All data are
from the annual COMPUSTAT industrial tapes and the sample period is 1971 through 2001. The debt and cash models are
jointly estimated (within constraint types) and the empirical error structure allows for unstructured correlation across models.
t-statistics (in parentheses).
Panel A: Constrained Firms
Financial Constraints Criteria
Payout Policy Firm Size Bond Ratings CP Ratings
Endogenous Policy Variable:
1. Debt Issuance (Net of Retirements)
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs 0.1685** 0.1401** 0.3237** 0.0983**
(3.78) (2.74) (7.19) (2.88)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs —0.1206** —0.1051** —0.0549* —0.0348
(—2.63) (—2.67) (—2.03) (—1.71)
P -Value of Diff. High—Low Hedging [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
2. Increases in Cash Holdings
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs 0.1697** 0.2130** 0.1617** 0.1733**
(5.01) (4.74) (4.05) (6.27)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs 0.1400** 0.0727 0.0273 0.0864*
(2.63) (1.40) (0.57) (2.34)
P -Value of Diff. High—Low Hedging [0.64] [0.04] [0.03] [0.06]
Notes: *,** indicate statistical significance at the 5- and 1-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 6: – Continued
Panel B: Unconstrained Firms
Financial Constraints Criteria
Payout Policy Firm Size Bond Ratings CP Ratings
Endogenous Policy Variable:
1. Debt Issuance (Net of Retirements)
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs —0.4342** —0.2890** —0.2889** —0.4642**
(—12.91) (—8.70) (—10.56) (—15.49)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs —0.3406** —0.1612 —0.2122** —0.3952**
(10.47) (—1.16) (—3.57) (—3.26)
P -Value of Diff. High—Low Hedging [0.05] [0.37] [0.24] [0.58]
2. Increases in Cash Holdings
Firms w/ High Hedging Needs 0.0097 —0.0174 0.0585* —0.0332
(0.25) (—0.57) (2.19) (—1.03)
Firms w/ Low Hedging Needs —0.1159* —0.1129* 0.0253 —0.0851
(—2.20) (—2.43) (0.53) (—1.73)
P -Value of Diff. High—Low Hedging [0.05] [0.09] [0.54] [0.38]
Notes: *,** indicate statistical significance at the 5- and 1-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
